Alexander Baturo (Dublin City University), who is currently visiting the department for a three-month period, will give a talk on his paper “Reshuffles or Dismissals? The Logic of Elite Management and Autocratic Survival” (see abstract below). The talk is part of the speaker series on Democracy and Development and is scheduled for 16 January 2025 at 1 pm in the large meeting room (1330-126).

Alex studies comparative authoritarianism, political leadership, and international organizations. His current research primarily focuses on the behaviour of authoritarian actors in multilateral organizations, particularly in the United Nations, as well as on domestic regime legitimation and elite management, applying text-as-data approaches. He has published books with Oxford UP and Michigan UP, including The New Kremlinology (2021). Moreover, Alex’s articles have appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, the British Journal of Political Science, and Political Research Quarterly, among others, and his work has been cited, inter alia, in the Washington Post, Bloomberg, and Tages Anzeiger.

If anyone would like to meet up with Alex, while he is here, please do not hesitate to write him at alex.baturo@dcu.ie.

Abstract: While co-optation and repression are at the center of authoritarian power-sharing, how autocrats implement such strategies in their interactions with individual elites remains undertheorized. We propose a novel framework centered on dictators as managers of their ruling coalitions. Under seemingly stable institutional arrangements or in the absence of a purge, dictators routinely appoint, dismiss, promote, demote, shuffle, or reappoint elites, in the process altering the information environment and incentives. Generally, reshuffles prevent elite coordination but ensure elites have a stake in regime continuity; dismissals reduce elite power but increase intra-regime conflict and uncertainty. Using new measures of dismissals and reshuffles in all autocratic cabinets and communist Politburos—while also accounting for mechanisms, alternative explanations, and supplementing with a case study—we find that many long-lasting autocrats survive by relying primarily on reshuffles, not dismissals, practicing more mundane and nonviolent politics than seen in predominantly conflictual accounts of authoritarianism.

No registration needed. The talk is open to everyone.

We look forward to seeing you there!